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Preface 
This issue of the ILCA Bulletin includes papers on climate and drought in Ethiopia, the 
productivity of traditional pastoral systems, the role of government policies in regulating dairy 
imports and the possible impact of these imports on dairy development in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The first article discusses the climatic events that have preceded drought and famine in 
Ethiopia. Using a computer model that provides an estimate of the moisture available for crop 
growth, the authors have been able to estimate the length of the crop growing period and the 
implications for crop production in a region. The preliminary results of an analysis that related 
seasonal rainfall to the recorded incidence of recent Ethiopian famines reveal that the onset of 
famine is not always due to crop failure in a single year; surpluses from previous good years are 
often available to meet any sudden shortfall. The authors show that the development of a 
famine is usually more complex: in famine-prone areas of Ethiopia, where a bimodal rainfall 
pattern is common, severe famine periods have followed a sequence of 2 or more years in 
which the short rains failed, and the main growing periods were either marginal or so short that 
crop failure was inevitable. By closely following these rainfall patterns it may be possible to give 
an early warning of the occurrence of famine within a region. 
The second article presents an analysis of the productivity of a traditional pastoral system. 
Pastoralists have often been referred to as unproductive, and their rangelands are said to have 
great potential for improvement. However, ILCA's studies of the Borana pastoralists in southern 
Ethiopia have shown that traditional, subsistence-oriented pastoralists are much more 
productive in terms of energy per unit of land than commercial enterprises operating in similar 
environments. The major difference between the two forms of enterprise is that the Borana are 
more interested in milk than meat, since their main concern is the support of a relatively large 
number of people. They do this very successfully and, because of the high productivity of their 
system, the author suggests that the options for improvement are rather limited. 
The third article considers dairy imports into sub-Saharan Africa. Over the last decade these 
imports, be they commercial or in the form of food aid, have increased dramatically. At present 
about 30% of the dairy products consumed in the continent are imported. The author discusses 
the factors that have contributed to this situation, and how government policies have influenced 
the level and nature of dairy imports. It is assumed that the high levels of imports have acted as 
disincentives to domestic milk production, but the paucity of data makes it difficult to reach any 
firm conclusion. More in-depth, individual country studies will be needed in order to determine 
the impact of government policies on dairy imports and on the development of the local industry. 
Wayne Ralph, Richard Stewart, Editors  
Inca Alipui, Assistant Editor 
ILCA Bulletin, 
Publications Section, ILCA, 
P.O. Box 5689, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
  
Moisture availability, cropping period and the prospects for 
early warning of famine in Ethiopia 
B.L. Henricksen and J.W. Durkin 
Computer Unit, ILCA, 
P.O. Box 5689, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
Summary 
DROUGHT AND FAMINE occur regularly throughout sub-Saharan Africa, and their effects are 
particularly severe in heavily populated countries such as Ethiopia. Over the last 30 years, four 
major drought periods and associated famines of varying degrees of severity have been 
recorded in Ethiopia. 
Relatively simple models are available to predict the moisture available for plant growth using 
standard meteorological data. Since moisture availability is directly related to crop production, 
such models may make 
it possible to give an early warning of crop shortfalls and the onset of famine. 
In this paper, a moisture availability model developed by the Food and Agricultural Organization 
(FAO) of the United Nations is used to estimate the periods since 1953 when there has been 
sufficient moisture available for satisfactory crop growth at different locations in Ethiopia. The 
preliminary results of an analysis using existing meteorological data show that short length of 
growing periods correlate well with the recorded incidence of drought and famine in the country. 
Across the drought- and famine-prone areas of northern and central Ethiopia there is a bimodal 
distribution of rainfall and cropping is usually restricted to the period of the main rains which 
occur during June to September. Although the short rains falling between February and May 
generally do not provide enough moisture to support a crop, they are important because it is 
during this period that much of the land preparation and cultivation takes place. If land 
preparation is largely completed during the short rains, the farmer can take full advantage of the 
main rains. 
If the short rains fail, most land preparation can only begin after the start of the main rains, and 
this preparation time cuts into the period available for crop growth. Historically, severe famine 
periods have been associated with a sequence of 2 or more years in which the short rains failed 
and the resultant main-season growing periods were either marginal or so short that crop failure 
was inevitable. 
Introduction 
Plant growth and crop yield are closely related to the amount of moisture available during the 
growing season. Relatively simple models are available that can quantify this relationship and, 
when fed appropriate data, can be used not only to predict but also to partially explain past crop 
failures. The opportunity to analyse data on moisture availability, and to develop a predictive 
model for application in Ethiopia, arose in August 1984 through cooperation between ILCA, FAO 
and the Land Use Planning and Regulatory Department of the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture. 
Methods 
A computer program originally developed by FAO for an agro-ecological study of crop suitability 
in Africa (FAO, 1978) was installed on the Hewlett Packard 3000 computing system at ILCA 
headquarters in Addis Ababa. The FAO program estimates the moisture available for crop 
growth in individual months of the year, using data of the type described in Table 1. The length 
of growing period (LGP) is calculated through a simple water balance model that relates 
precipitation (P) and moisture stored in the soil (S) to the potential evapotranspiration (ETp) of 
the crop, the latter being assessed using the Penman formula (Penman, 1948). Crop production 
can then be estimated, at least qualitatively, in terms of the time during which plant growth can 
proceed without serious restriction due to moisture stress. 
Table 1. Parameters used in the calculation of LGPs. 
Abbreviation Parameter 
P Monthly precipitation (mm) 
T Daily average temperature for the month (°C) 
Tx Average maximum temperature for the month (°C) 
Tn Average minimum temperature for the month (°C) 
e Average vapour pressure (mb) 
RH Relative humidity (%) 
U Average wind speed at 2 m above ground (m.sec–1) 
n Monthly average number of sunshine hours per day 
n/N Percentage of possible sunshine hours 
Rg Total radiation (cal. cm–
2 day–1 ) 
Rn Net radiation (cal. cm–
2 day –1) 
ETp Potential evapotranspiration (mm. Month–
1) 
S Stored soil moisture (mm) 
Monthly ETP varies little between years, and the LGP can be estimated with reasonable 
precision from rainfall data once the mean ETp has been calculated from long-term records. 
Fortunately precipitation, and to a lesser extent temperature, are both widely recorded in 
Ethiopia. A number of other parameters required in the original calculation of ETP were 
estimated from nearby locations (FAO, 1984). 
For the purposes of the following analysis the LGP is defined as the period in days when 
moisture supply from precipitation exceeds half the potential evapotranspiration (from Penman, 
1948), plus that period during which plants evapotranspire stored soil moisture resulting from 
excess precipitation (definition modified after FAO, 1978). The stored soil moisture assumed to 
be available can be varied in the computer program from 0 to 200 mm in intervals of 50 mm. 
This allows factors such as soil texture and depth to be taken into account. Any time interval 
when water is available but the temperature is too low for crop growth is excluded from the 
calculation of LGP. 
A typical growing period includes a 'humid period' when P exceeds ETP, enabling the soil profile 
to accumulate a moisture reserve and plant growth to proceed without restriction from moisture 
stress. Such a growing period is termed a 'normal growing period'. Growing periods where P 
remains between 0.5 and 1.0 ETp are referred to as `intermediate'. No soil moisture reserve 
accumulates under these circumstances, since P remains less than ETP. The choice of 0.5 
ETp as the threshold value for moisture availability is based on considerable experimental 
evidence that important physiological changes are induced in many crops below 0.5 
ETp (Doorenbos and Kassam, 1979). Germination also proceeds in most crops when P exceeds 
0.5 ETP. 
Results and discussion 
Rainfall distribution patterns in central and northern Ethiopia 
The annual rainfall distribution in the central and northern highlands of Ethiopia, including those 
areas periodically affected by drought, is generally bimodal (FAO, 1984). The first period of 
rainfall, usually in the months of February to May, provides a growing period of between 5 and 
100 days, depending on the location. The longer growing periods during this short rainy season 
are more likely to occur along the northeastern escarpment running from southern Tigray 
through Wello to northern and central Shewa. The variability in the length and frequency of 
these rains is much greater than that of the main rains occurring from June/July to September. 
Figure 1 gives a typical example of moisture availability during 1981 in areas surrounding the 
northern highlands town of Asmara. An intermediate growing period of approximately 30 days 
occurred around April, followed by a dry period of about 45 days, after which the onset of the 
main rainy season quickly raised soil moisture above 0.5 ETp. In the example given the LGP 
from June to September was 85 days. 
Figure 1. Precipitation and evapotranspiration at Asmara, 1981. 
 
Generally, the short rains are insufficient for producing all but the most rapidly maturing crops; 
they may fail altogether or occasionally merge with the long rains. The dry period between the 
short rainy season and the onset of the main rains is usually too long to allow the planting of 
long-season crops before the start of the main rains. Highland sorghum may be planted during 
the short rains in areas where these are more reliable and substantial, but only at the risk of 
severe yield reduction or complete crop failure in a bad year. 
The importance of soil depth in reducing moisture stress 
Stocking and Pain (1983) have examined in some detail the concept of available soil moisture 
and the minimum soil depth necessary for crop production. Assuming that a 50% yield reduction 
is tolerable, surprisingly shallow soils appear capable of supporting the production of crops such 
as sorghum. 
Rainfall patterns in northern and central Ethiopia during the main rainy season are characterised 
by heavy monthly falls of between 150 and 350 mm in July and August. This rainy season 
begins and ends rather abruptly. The moisture index (P/ETp) for July and August normally 
exceeds 1, and may in fact exceed 2 or 3 even in relatively dry years. However, little additional 
rain falls after the second week of September. Consequently crops must draw on stored soil 
moisture after only about 60 to 80 days, and considerably sooner if late land preparation delays 
planting. 
The ability of soils to store water from the 2 previous wet months is thus a critical factor in the 
final crop yield. Much depends on the growing season requirements of the crop itself, but 
Stocking and Pain's assumption that soil moisture recharge occurs 10 times during the growing 
season is probably not applicable to Ethiopia, making minimum soil depth requirements 
somewhat greater if acceptable yields are to be achieved. 
Figure 2, derived from Doorenbos and Kassam (1979), shows the reduction in actual 
evapotranspiration (ETa) over time from the point of last recharge, for four different soil storage 
capacities. Assuming that the maximum evapotranspiration of the crop (Etm) is 8 mm/day, then 
for a soil storage capacity of 50 mm ETa/ETm it is reduced below 0.5 after 12 days. Beyond this 
point yields are assumed to fall to less than 50% of their potential. For a storage capacity of 100 
mm it is 24 days before the same degree of yield reduction occurs. This emphasises the 
importance of soil moisture storage after the rainy season has ended. 
Figure 2. Reduction in evapotranspiration over time. 
 
Because of the shallow soils that are found over much of the famine-prone areas of Ethiopia 
(FAO, 1984x), a substantial proportion of the precipitation falling during the heavy main rains is 
lost as runoff. For Asmara and Mekele the assumed storage capacity is 50 mm, since at both 
locations the medium-textured soils are generally less than 50 cm deep. Medium-textured soils 
are assumed to have available soil water capacities of about 140 mm/m (Doorenbos and 
Kassam, 1979), and this is consistent with a storage of about 50 mm in a soil less than 50 cm 
deep. 
In Asmara, for example, P/ETp in 1981 exceeded 3 in July and 2 in August (see Figure 1), yet 
the main-season LGP was still only 85 days because most of the rain would have run off the 
land. Despite an apparently favourable total rainfall, the LGP during 1981 extended only into 
September. 
Annual variability of LGP in drought-prone areas of Ethiopia 
The effect of moisture stress was investigated by estimating the LGP in cases where severe 
yield reductions or total crop failures are reported to have occurred in drought-prone areas of 
Ethiopia. The preceding climatic events and the moisture available from the short rains were 
also examined to gain a more complete understanding of the famine cycle. 
Some empirical data on the effect of LGP on crop yield were obtained from research reports of 
the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (TAR). Unfortunately, the limited nature of the 
data meant that no firm conclusions could be reached. Data from ILCA's Debre Berhan 
research station were also examined for five different crops, for the years 1979 to 1983. The 
results of this analysis are shown in Figure 3 where each point represents the weighted mean 
yield from 42 cooperating farmers growing traditional crop cultivars. 
Figure 3. Effect of length of growing period on crop yields, ILCA, Debre Berhan, 1979–1983. 
 
Yields of all crops show a generally upward trend with increasing LGP, except those of wheat 
and barley at an LGP of 190 days when an excess of moisture may have influenced the results. 
However, for the purpose of studying the effects of serious moisture stress, Debre Berhan is not 
a suitable station, as the minimum LGP was more than 130 days in the years for which data are 
available. Further research into the effects of moisture availability on crop yields in Ethiopia is 
clearly needed before firm conclusions can be reached. 
Figure 4 shows the year-to-year variation in the main-season LGP for three meteorological 
stations in traditional grain-producing areas of Ethiopia, spanning the period from 1953 to 1983. 
Table 2 gives the location and altitude of each station. 
Figure 4. Crop growing period at three Ethiopian sites, 1953–1983. 
 
Table 2. Variation in main-season LGP at three Ethiopian sites, 1953–1983. 
Site Location 
Altitude 
(m.a.s.l.) 
Mean main- 
season LGP 
(days) 
Standard 
deviation 
Coefficient 
of variation 
(%) 
Addis Ababa 9° 02'N, 38° 45'E 2408 235 50 21 
Kombolcha 11° 05'N, 39° 45'E 1903 133 20 15 
Asmara 15° 17'N, 38° 55'E 2355 89 20 22 
Most crops grown in Ethiopia, with the exception of some pulses and very low-yielding varieties 
of teff and wheat, require a growing season of at least 90 days. This generalisation is of course 
dependent on temperature and, as altitude increases and temperatures fall, a crop requires a 
progressively longer LGP if it is to yield successfully. Above 2000 m a.s.l. in Ethiopia, highland 
varieties of sorghum and maize commonly require between 150 and 180 days to reach maturity; 
on the other hand, at lower altitudes these crops mature in only 90 to 120 days. Thus short 
growing periods in the highlands can be a serious problem for such crops. 
The data for Asmara show that the longest LGPs over a 31-year period rarely exceeded 90 
days, and particularly low values were recorded in the years 1966–69 and 1972–74, which were 
both famine periods in northern Ethiopia. While the identification of drought years is not quite as 
simple as estimating the LGP in a given year, it is worth noting that Asmara had rather short 
main-season LGPs in most years of the period under study. This in turn must have severely 
limited the range of suitable crops for the region since, at such a high altitude, the optimal 
growing period for barley, for example, probably exceeds 90 days. 
Addis Ababa and Kombolcha both have much longer LGPs, but these varied substantially. 
Farmers planting late-maturing crops in the vicinity of Addis Ababa will undoubtedly have poor 
yields in some years. However, the shortest LGP recorded for the main growing season in both 
Addis Ababa and Kombolcha still exceeded the maximum for Asmara. The average LGP for 
Kombolcha (133 days) is lower than that for Addis Ababa (235 days) but 120 days was 
exceeded in most years and, as will be noted later, rainfall in Kombolcha tends to be more 
bimodal in its distribution, from which crop production can benefit substantially. 
Role of the short rains in crop production 
There is a relationship between reported drought periods and the failure of the short rains in 
those years when the main-season LGP was less than 90 days. Crops can be grown 
successfully if the short rains are sufficiently prolonged, but for much of the highlands, including 
the drought-prone areas of Wello, Tigray and Eritrea, these rains are so unreliable that farmers 
cannot regularly take advantage of them for cropping. Unreliable as they are, the short rains are 
still very important because they facilitate land preparation prior to the main cropping season. 
Land preparation in Ethiopia with the traditional ox-drawn plough is extremely difficult if the soil 
is either very dry or excessively wet. Thus, ideally, land preparation begins at the end of each 
harvest before soils dry out, and starts again during the short rains when the soil is easily 
worked. Such a practice enables farmers to plant early in the main rainy season and takes full 
advantage of the available LGP. If the short rains fail, however, land preparation can only begin 
after the onset of the main rains. Consequently, planting is delayed well beyond the start of the 
main growing season and crops may be subjected to moisture stress if the rains end early. At 
higher altitudes, generally above 2300 m a.s.l., the risk of frost damage to late-season crops 
must also be considered. 
The total time needed for land preparation varies with the crop and the soil, but is generally 
between 10 and 30 days. If this time is subtracted from the main-season LGP in a year when 
little or no land preparation is possible because of the failure of the short rains, then the 
likelihood of crop failure is greatly increased. 
Case studies 
Figures 5, 6 and 7 support the suggestion that the combination of a failure in the short rains and 
a shortened main-season LGP has, historically, coincided with serious drought and famine 
years in northern Ethiopia. 
Asmara, 1953–1983 
In Figure 5 the main-season LGP for Asmara from 1953 to 1983 is shown by a solid black line. 
The dotted line represents the total number of growing days in the same years, thus highlighting 
the contribution from the small rains. Between 1953 and 1960 the total LGP and the main-
season LGP were the same, indicating that effectively no short rains fell in those years. 
Figure 5. Main rains LGP and total growing period, Asmara, 1953–1983. 
 
Growing periods of 95 days or less, with a minimum of 80 days in 1957, occurred between 1955 
and 1958. Assuming that land preparation had to take place during the main cropping season, 
the total LGP probably varied between 50 and 85 days, indicating a substantial cumulative loss 
in both grain supplies and the seed available for planting. Draught animals and the human 
population in the Asmara area must have been in poor condition by 1957 and 1958, and 
substantial numbers of people died in Wello and Tigray during the period following the 1957/58 
drought, although a locust infestation exacerbated the problems caused by the low rainfall 
(Tafesse Olkeba, 1984). 
In 1966 a serious drought appears to have occurred around Asmara. The short rains failed 
totally and the main-season LGP fell to around 50 days, indicating that most crops probably 
failed. In the following 3 years the main-season LGP was less than 90 days, although in 1967 
and 1968 the total number of days suitable for crop growth exceeded 100. Another serious 
failure occurred in 1969 with no short rains evident and an LGP of less than 60 days. 
From 1969 to 1974 a period of extreme drought occurred in the Asmara area. In 1971 and 1972 
some crops may have been successful, but a shortage of seed carried over from the preceding 
years probably limited plantings. Substantial crop failure is again indicated for Asmara from 
1972 to 1974 with no short rains and an LGP of about 75 days in each of these years. This 
period coincides with the widely reported famine of 1971–74. 
Although there were no short rains from 1969 to 1977, in 1975 and 1977 the main season LGPs 
were very favourable for crop production. In 1981 the main-season LGP again fell below 90 
days although the short rains in that year were favourable. In 1982 good short rains and a very 
favourable July-to-September rainfall distribution again assisted crop production. 
In 1983 the short rains were limited and the main-season LGP fell to about 70 days, almost 
certainly resulting in crop shortfalls. However, because of the relatively good season in 1982, 
reserves were probably available to farmers in 1983. 
Figures for the first half of 1984 for Asmara suggest that while the short rains did fall, the July 
rainfall was poor and the prospects for successful crops depended on the August and 
September rainfall. In the past, 2 successive years of crop shortfalls have been associated with 
famine. The year 1984 was therefore a crucial year in this respect. 
Mekele, 1964–1983 
Unfortunately, the meteorological data available for Mekele do not allow as comprehensive an 
analysis as for Asmara, but the 20-year period does span three reported drought periods in 
northern Ethiopia (Figure 6). Historically, Mekele is one of the hardest-hit famine areas in the 
country, and its recent climatic history warrants close inspection. 
Figure 6. Main rains LGP and total growing period, Mekele, 1964–1983. 
 
The years 1964 and 1965 are reported as drought years in Ethiopia (Tafesse Olkeba, 1984), but 
little regional documentation is available. In view of the marginal LGPs, particularly in 1965 and 
1966, food reserves around Mekele in 1966 and 1967 must have been low. The inadequate 
1967 rainfall and poor harvests must have contributed to an accumulating shortfall in grain 
supplies, and animal and human condition in the region during 1967 and 1968 will have been 
poor. 
Although the main-season LGP in 1969 was not very long, the considerable short rains would 
have assisted land preparation and provided good forage for livestock. In 1970 the short rains 
failed and the main season LGP was less than 100 days, with land preparation cutting into this 
period. The year 1971 was a poor year with no short rains to assist land preparation and only 80 
days of moisture available for crop growth. In 1972 the combination of some short rains and a 
growing season longer than 100 days provided a slight respite, but cumulative effects on the 
seed supply and on the condition of both draught animals and the human population were 
probably being felt. 
The 2 years which followed led to the widely reported famine of 1974. No effective short rains 
fell in either 1973 or 1974, and the main-season LGPs of just over 90 and 70 days respectively 
resulted in yield reductions in 1973 and almost total crop failure in 1974. The build-up to the 
famine in 1974 around Mekele is less obvious than for Asmara. However, warning signs were 
certainly apparent by 1973, and perhaps even by 1971, when a possible poor seed supply and 
the deteriorating condition of both draught animals and the human population meant that 
farmers were unable to take advantage of the somewhat improved farming conditions in 1972. 
As in Asmara, conditions around Mekele in 1975 improved greatly with a total LGP of almost 
130 days. Conditions in 1976 and 1977 were marginal with LGPs of between 90 and 100 days. 
No short rains in 1978, and an LGP of less than 90 days, must have again put food production 
at risk in the region. A serious problem is indicated in 1979, both from the total rainfall figures 
and from the unusual rainfall distribution. The total LGP for 1979 was less than 90 days, which 
in itself would have limited production, but the longest component of the total LGP recorded was 
less than 60 days. Fortunately, considerable short rains fell in 1980, followed by a main season 
LGP of 90 days. To what extent farmers were in a position to take advantage of this improved 
situation is unknown. 
LGPs of between 90 and 100 days, with no short rains, were recorded in 1981 and 1982. Total 
rainfall improved in 1983, but this was mainly due to reasonable short rains. The main-season 
LGP was again less than 90 days. 
Thus 3 consecutive years in which the main-season LGPs were barely 90 days, and only 1 year 
in which the short rains fell, indicate that problems were accumulating. If the short rains were to 
fail in 1984, famine would be the likely consequence, especially if the main-season rains did not 
begin until late June or early July. Although no reliable meteorological data were available at the 
time of writing, indications were that this unfortunate scenario did indeed take place. 
Kombolcha, 1953–1983 
Figure 7 indicates a more favourable situation in Kombolcha. LGPs were generally much longer 
than those in Mekele or Asmara, although serious departures from the norm are likely to disrupt 
agricultural production since plantings in any one year are influenced by the farmers' 
anticipation of the growing season. 
Figure 7. Main rains LGP and total growing period, Kombolcha. 1953–1983. 
 
For several periods over the 30 years studied the main-season LGPs for Kombolcha remained 
between 100 and 130 days, as in the period 1953–1961. The clearer bimodality of rainfall 
however ensures more time for land preparation and even allows two cropping seasons in some 
years. A combination of a failure of the short rains and a main-season LGP of less than 130 
days occurred in 1965, 1973 and 1978. In fact this situation in 1965 coincided with reported 
drought elsewhere in the country, as did that for the 1973 cropping season. It is interesting to 
note that substantial short rains fell in 1971, but that the main-season LGP in that year was the 
shortest recorded in the period studied. Crop production around Kombolcha was probably lower 
than usual during 1971 and 1973, and this may have reduced the grain surpluses available for 
distribution to nearby famine areas in those years. 
The failure of the short rains and the low main-season LGP in 1978 was followed by a 
considerably better season in 1979. Sufficient short rains fell in 1977 and the carry-over 
production from a very favourable year in 1976 would have buffered any production shortfall in 
1978. 
Debre Markos, 1953–1983 
Data from Debre Markos (Figure 8) are included to permit comparison with one of the most 
productive grain-growing areas of the country. No data are available for 1970 and 1980, but the 
remaining data are sufficiently clear to show that reliable production was to be expected. It is 
notable that the shortest main-season LGP recorded in this 30-year time span was 185 days. 
The probability of total crop failure due to moisture stress in the region is thus negligible. 
Figure 8. Main rains LGP and total growing period, Debre Markos, 1954–1983. 
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
LGP and the development of an effective early warning system 
The argument developed above underlines the fact that if soil moisture levels are less than 
those required by crops for uninhibited growth, then yield reductions, and in the most severe 
cases total crop failures, are inevitable. Low annual rainfall, poor rainfall distribution throughout 
the year, high evapotranspiration and shallow soils all contribute to a moisture deficit. Since the 
calculation of LGP encompasses all these factors, an analysis of LGP on a year-to-year basis 
gives some insight into the reasons for repeated famine over much of the country. 
The present study indicates that the serious famine periods recorded at Mekele and Asmara 
over the past 20 to 30 years were preceded by 2 or more consecutive years in which the main-
season LGP was less than 90 days, and in which the short rains failed. Up-to-date analyses of 
LGP could therefore constitute the basis of an early warning system to indicate the likelihood of 
serious famine in drought-prone areas of the country. 
Danger signals based on these criteria were apparent at Mekele after the 1981 and 1982 
seasons. Small but significant short rains in 1983, although followed by a main season LGP of 
less than 90 days, may have bridged the gap in production until 1984. Preliminary rainfall 
figures obtained from the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) in September 1984 
indicate that no effective short rains fell until April, after which data were not available. It is clear 
from the widespread famine in the region that the main rains were insufficient and did not 
extend significantly into September; the 1984 crops failed and the preceding years had left no 
reserves. 
For Asmara, danger signals were less apparent until 1983. This could explain the present lack 
of famine reports from further north in Eritrea, the region surrounding Asmara. However, based 
on the analysis for Asmara presented above, shortfalls in crop production seemed inevitable in 
1984 unless the long rains persisted into September. A crucial indicator for Asmara will be 
whether or not substantial short rains occur before the end of April 1985. Alternatively, a long 
main-season LGP in 1985, from May/June until September, may enable land preparation to 
begin sufficiently early in the season to ensure good crop growth without moisture stress. If 
neither occurs, severe shortages of locally produced food reserves must be expected, extending 
the famine much further north during 1985. 
Obviously, Asmara and Mekele represent only a small sample of the famine-stricken areas of 
Ethiopia. Historical analysis of as many additional locations as possible is desirable in order to 
develop a more generally applicable early warning system. Using the LGP computer programs 
installed at ILCA, it is now possible to review moisture conditions on a monthly or yearly basis 
for any location in the country for which suitable monthly climatic data are available. Periods of 
extreme moisture stress and probable crop failures in drought-prone areas can thus be 
identified. This suggests that patterns leading to famine, similar to those detected in Asmara 
and Mekele, might be identified in other areas after more extensive analysis. It is possible that 
patterns of moisture conditions and famine are very location specific, but this can only be 
confirmed by additional data collection and analysis. 
Regardless of the detailed nature of such patterns, an index of the moisture conditions 
preceding former famine periods for each new location could be built up in a manner similar to 
that discussed for Asmara and Mekele. When historically unfavourable patterns begin to 
emerge, a close watch on the current season's rainfall would provide, by late July, an early 
warning of crop failures for most of the central and northern highlands of the country. However, 
such an early warning system can only be effective if meteorological data are recorded and 
transmitted rapidly to a centre equipped to analyse them. Such analyses could be carried out by 
ILCA's Computer Unit. 
Calibration of satellite early warning systems using LGPs 
Information from the NOAA series of satellites has been used in West Africa to estimate 
vegetative biomass production (Tucker et al, 1982). The use of such satellite imagery has also 
been proposed to monitor, and to give early warning of, drought conditions throughout Africa. 
When compared with the spectral responses of vegetation recorded on NOAH imagery, a time 
sequence of moisture indices calculated from the LGP computer-program opens up the 
possibility of calibrating satellite data with moisture availability and LGP. If this proves feasible, 
the LGP in a given year could be monitored directly using NOAA data, eliminating the need for 
monthly meteorological inputs. 
Long-term agronomic limitations in drought-prone areas 
A striking feature of the agro-climatic analysis for both Mekele and Asmara is the limited 
duration and the high degree of variability of the crop growing periods. This inevitably leads to 
marginal crop yields in many years, and because of increasing population, famine can be 
expected to recur with increasing frequency in the future. This is borne out to some extent by 
the relatively short period of unfavourable agricultural conditions preceding the current famine in 
northern Ethiopia, compared with the longer build-up to the 1974 famine. To what extent other 
factors such as disruption of traditional supply routes and cultivation patterns, due to civil unrest, 
contributed to the rapid onset and severity of the current famine is unknown. 
An effective early warning system is, unfortunately, only a means of detection; it does not solve 
the problems associated with drought and famine. Over the longer term fundamental changes 
will need to be made to existing production systems: land use will have to be rationalised so that 
erosion-prone soils are conserved by sowing on them permanent grassland and leguminous 
forages; better adapted, rapidly maturing crop cultivars should be sought; alternative cultivation 
systems which conserve soil moisture should be investigated; and it may be possible to trap and 
store the excessive and destructive runoff associated with heavy rains in ponds or dams 
constructed using draught oxen. Even a small store of irrigation water could be used on a 
limited area basis to establish crops just before the onset of the main rains or to enable them to 
mature without experiencing moisture stress; in either case, the growing period would be 
extended. When combined with more suitable crop cultivars and more widespread use of 
fertilizer, much better crop production could be expected; perhaps more importantly, the 
production would be more reliable than at present. 
A partial and possibly only a temporary alternative to agricultural change is to alter the 
distribution of the population, by resettlement programmes in less drought-prone areas of 
Ethiopia. There are significant costs, both human and material, attached to both approaches. 
However, unless major change is attempted, more frequent and massive imports of food aid will 
be needed to alleviate the suffering associated with the inevitable famines of the future. 
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Summary 
AFRICAN PASTORAL systems are often considered to be relatively unproductive, with poor 
breeds of animals, poorly fed and badly managed, present in such large numbers that serious 
rangeland degradation is unavoidable. The large herds are viewed as the result of the 
pastoralists' irrational attachment to their animals, with prestige and status, rather than 
economic gain, allegedly being the pastoralists' main concerns. 
An analysis of the Borana pastoral system in southern Ethiopia has shown that this view is 
wrong. The Borana system is very productive; compared with Australian commercial ranches in 
a similar climatic environment, the Borana produce nearly four times as much protein and six 
times as much food energy from each hectare. Their major concern is not the number of cows 
owned but the number of people supported by the rangeland. 
Introducing food crops and legume forages into the Borana pastoral system would effect some 
improvements. The study suggests that the present Borana family's annual income of 
approximately US$ 240 could be doubled if a 'package' of improvements were adopted, but an 
income of US$ 480 is still very modest, and continuing population increases could negate even 
this advance. 
Introduction 
East African pastoral systems have been described as inefficient and unproductive, and as 
making a disproportionately small contribution to national production and export earnings. East 
African pastoralists have been described as bad range managers and livestock husbandmen, 
whose communal use of land and poor stock breeding policies have denuded vast areas of 
rangelands. 
Development projects have been aimed at restructuring traditional systems of extensive 
livestock production in the belief that this would increase offtake and pastoralists' incomes. High 
stocking rates were alleged to lead to low productivity and degradation of the rangelands. 
'Solutions' generally included a reduction of stocking rates and the introduction of 'improved' 
range management techniques. However, very few of these projects have been successful. 
If pastoralists seem unduly attached to unproductive animals, or to anachronistic economic 
activities or social organisations, this is the result of the environment in which they live, and of 
the objectives of their society. While there are some intangible 'romance' factors associated with 
pastoral life, it is more often hard, insecure and uncomfortable. 
Pastoralists, like any other human group, will change from one way of life to another if they 
perceive significant economic and social benefits. They are not opposed to the idea of change 
but express a healthy scepticism about the advantages it may bring them. Pastoralists can be 
entrepreneurs but, in an environment where the margin between survival and disaster is slim, 
and in a production system where the effects of decisions are felt for years, they are naturally 
cautious. 
If pastoralists are indeed rational people, are their grazing systems really as unproductive and 
inefficient as they have been described? To the pastoralist the basic unit is land, and the 
productivity per unit area of this land determines how many people can be directly supported. It 
is this measure rather than the productivity per animal that is important. Work near Athi River in 
Kenya (Potter, 1979) has shown that while a stocking rate of 0.2 head/ha produced a liveweight 
gain of 418 g/day/ head and 84 g/day/ha, a stocking rate of 0.5 head/ha produced only 342 
g/day/head but 171 g/day/ha. High stocking rates in pastoral systems mean poorer productivity 
per animal but greater production per unit area. 
In African pastoral systems land is a scarce and shrinking resource. Under this pressure, the 
objective of a pastoral society is to support more people per unit area of arid land and to give 
them as much security as possible, by maximising food production per hectare. Most 
pastoralists achieve these multiple goals by increasing the production and consumption of milk, 
which is far more important for them than the consumption and sale of meat. This objective of 
pastoral systems has been overlooked in the past, and superficial comparisons with western-
type beef ranching systems have led to false conclusions about the efficiency and productivity of 
African pastoral systems. 
The productivity of pastoral systems 
The productivity of pastoral systems has usually been measured in terms of market offtake, 
completely ignoring the food used for human subsistence. The animal protein (AP) and gross 
energy (GE) produced annually from each hectare are more appropriate comparative indices of 
productivity. Table 1 shows that the pastoral Borana of southern Ethiopia produce about 2 kg 
AP/ ha/yr compared with about 1.9 kg AP/ha/yr from ranches in the Laikipia District of Kenya. 
These ranches are also based on Boran animals and have a better, but comparable, bimodal 
rainfall regime. In terms of energy output the Borana pastoralists outstrip the ranchers, 
producing 148 MJ GE/ha/yr from a combination of 10 kg/ha/ yr of animal liveweight gain and 25 
kg/ha/yr of milk, compared with 94 MJ GE/ha/yr produced from 18.6 kg/ha/yr of animal 
liveweight gain in Laikipia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Livestock production in East Africa and comparable regions. 
System/region 
Offtake per year Annual rainfall 
(kg L W/ha/yr) (kg AP/ha/yra) (MJ GE/ha/yrb) (mm) (mode) 
Pastoral Borana, Ethiopia 10.0 2.05 148 450–600 bi 
Transhumant, Mali – 0.6–3.2 – 500 mono 
Laikipia ranches, Kenya 
Best 31.9 3.25 153 690 bi 
Average 18.6 1.9 94 650 bi 
Cattle stations, Australia 
Alice Springs Districtc 4.95 0.51 24 300d bi 
Barkley Tablelandsc 3.5 0.36 17 375–300 mono 
Victoria River Districtc 4.46 0.45 22 400–900 mono 
aAP = Animal protein calculated as 0.102 kg/kg LW gain and 0.033 kg/litre of milk. In the Borana 
system, 0.020 kg is added for edible offal consumed.  
bMJ GE = Megajoules of gross energy edible by humans. A value of 11.5 MJ/kg of meat and a 
dressing-out percentage of 51% of which 15% is bone gives values of 4.14 MJ GE/kg LW for 
the Borana system and 5.04 MJ GE/kg LW for the Laikipia ranches. For the Borana system, 1.2 
MJ GE/kg LW was added for edible offal and 3.73 MJ/kg is used for whole milk.  
cFigures for Australian stations represent the area grazed which is 30–50% of total area leased 
to the stations. 
dArea grazed may receive up to 600 mm of rainfall. 
Sources: Nicholson and Cossins (1984); Petty et al (1979); Holt and Bertram (1981); Robertson 
(1983); Kenya Boran Breeders Society (pers. comm.); Breman and de Wit (1983); Foran (pers. 
comm.); Semenye and Chabari (1980); Agren and Gibson (1968). 
Comparable ranches in the Northern Territory of Australia produce less than 30% of the animal 
protein and less than 16% of the energy per hectare of the East African Borana system (Petty et 
al, 1979; Robertson, 1983). The Borana pastoral system thus compares very favourably with 
East African ranching areas in productivity per hectare and outproduces by far ranches in the 
arid areas of Australia. The starting point for any improvement of the Borana and other pastoral 
systems in Africa is thus quite high. 
The Borana pastoral system produces about as much animal protein as, and 56% more energy 
per unit area than, commercial ranching in Kenya's ecologically equivalent Laikipia District, and 
does so more cheaply. 
When measured against operating costs and labour inputs, the same set of production indices 
shows the real differences between pastoral systems and commercial ranches. The costs per 
unit of production for ranching systems in Laikipia and the Northern Territory are similar, while 
the costs in the Borana pastoral system are about 10% of those in the ranches (Table 2). 
Production per man-day, however, is 25 to 50 times higher for ranches in the Northern Territory 
than it is in the Borana system (Table 3). 
 
 
Table 2. Estimates of comparative costs of livestock production in three systems in arid areas. 
System 
Production costs 
(US$/kg LW) (US$/kg AP) (US$/100 MJ GE) 
Pastoral Borana 0.023–0.046 0.14–0.28 0.17–0.34 
Laikipia ranches 0.21 2.01 4.28 
Northern Territory ranches 0.20–0.40 1.93–3.89 4.08–8.25 
Table 3. Comparative livestock production per man-day in three systems in arid areas. 
System 
Production 
(kg AP/man-day) (MJ GE/man-day) 
Pastoral Borana 1.04 84 
Laikipia ranches 2.5–3.4 116–157 
Northern Territory ranches 47–53 2247–2515 
Sources: Nicholson and Cossins (1984); Petty et al (1979); Holt and Bertram (1981); Kenya 
Boran Breeders Society (pers. comm.). 
One great advantage of the pastoral system is its abundant labour supply. This feature permits 
individual treatment and handling of animals, facilitates the intensification of production, and has 
been largely ignored in development projects. Instead, such projects have concentrated on 
improving the extensive aspects of pastoral systems. 
Pastoralists have been criticised as poor husbandmen, insensitive to rangeland degradation, 
who keep an unduly high number of females in their herds compared with ranching enterprises. 
Table 4 shows that this is not necessarily true. 
Table 4. Comparative livestock production parameters in different systems in arid areas. 
System/region 
Calving 
percentage 
(%) 
Calf 
Mortality 
(%) 
Females as % of herd Total animal 
biomass 
(kgLW/ha) adult total 
Borana, pastoral 75 10–23 42 66 64–73 
Maasai, pastoral 76 8–10 33–45 68–73 36–89 
Mali, transhumant 56 28 41–42 65–68 – 
Laikipia ranches (range) 52–83 5–24 38 62 63–125 
Abernossa ranch, Ethiopia 70–78 5 38 73 140 
Alice Springs ranches 72–77 5–10 37 59 16a 
Barkley Tablelands 
ranches 
57 5–10 42 66 13a 
aCalculation based on area grazed. 
Sources: Nicholson and Cossins (1984); Semenye and de Leeuw (1984); Debebe (pers. 
comm.); Kenya Boran Breeders Society (pers. comm.); Petty et al (1979); Holt and Bertram 
(1981); Diallo et al (1981); Bille and Ole Pasha (1982). 
The percentage of females maintained in the herd depends on the objectives of the cattle 
owner. The pastoralist's primary goal of milk offtake contrasts with the rancher's goal of meat 
production, and requires a higher proportion of cows in the pastoral herd. In fact there are many 
ranches where, for very good reasons such as low calving rates, the percentage of females 
approaches that found in pastoral herds. 
Reproductive performance also should be seen in relation to the objectives of the system and to 
stocking rates. Pastoral systems, with their focus on production per hectare, may show poorer 
reproductive performances than ranches when reproduction rates are expressed per breeding 
female rather than per hectare. 
The annual variations in production within systems are often as large as those between 
systems, and seasonal climatic variations usually have a major influence on calving percentage 
and calf mortality. Calving percentage at the Athi River station in Kenya varied from 25% to 94% 
between 1974 and 1979, the major causes being varying rainfall (Potter, 1979) and the 
susceptibility of Zebu cows to anoestrus as a result of undernutrition during lactation. 
If the above data show that there are more similarities than differences in some production 
parameters between pastoral and ranching systems, there is nevertheless one parameter for 
which the difference between the two systems is startling. This difference is the basis of the 
misunderstanding about the productivity of pastoral systems. 
Milk offtake 
African pastoralists depend on milk for a large proportion of their diet and compete with their 
calves for this product; ranchers do not. As a result, while the production of animal protein and 
energy per unit area may be high in pastoral herds, calf growth from birth to weaning is 
extremely slow. Pastoral animals achieve mature weights much later than do comparable ranch 
animals; and mature body weights tend to be much lower than those of similar breeds in 
ranching situations. 
The effect of low weaning weights is to slow down the whole reproductive process. The age at 
first calving is 45 to 47 months in the Borana system compared with 29 to 33 months in a ranch 
system, and the age at which mature male breeding or sale weights are reached is 5 years 
rather than 3 years. The weights of Boran animals over 4 years in the Borana pastoral system, 
on the Ministry of Agriculture ranch at Abernossa, Ethiopia, and on commercial ranches in 
Laikipia District, Kenya, are shown in Table 5. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Boran cattle weights under different grazing conditions. 
System 
Boran cattle weights (kg) 
Birth 210 days 2 years 4 years 
M F M F M F M F 
Pastoral Borana 18.2 17.8 48 47 141 129 270 220 
Laikipia ranches 
Best – – 230 210 430 315 568 400 
Average 28 25 121 115 260 232 312 284 
Abernossa ranch 26 24 170 140 280 250 475 350 
Sources: Nicholson (1983a); Nicholson and Cossins (1984); Debebe (pers. comm.); Kenya 
Boran Breeders Society (pers. comm.); Semenye and Chabari (1980). 
Low calf weaning weights are common to all African pastoral systems. For example, Kenyan 
Maasai cattle have average weaning weights of 65 kg (Semenye and de Leeuw, 1984) and the 
cattle in the Mali transhumant system 61 kg (Diallo et al, 1981). To a self-sufficient pastoral 
society, the production of a regular supply of food in the form of milk is of primary importance. 
Slow calf growth rates and late maturity are far less important. Milk offtake by the pastoralists 
ranges from 200 kg/lactation for the Maasai (Semenye and de Leeuw, 1984), to 235 kg/lactation 
for the Mali transhumant system (Diallo et al, 1981), to 312 kg/lactation for the Borana 
(Nicholson, 1983). Total milk production per lactation, including the estimated consumption by 
the calf, is about 800 kg, 430 kg and 680 kg for the three systems respectively. 
The differences between the systems in calf growth over the first 210 days of life are striking. 
Boran calves raised under pastoral conditions gain on average 140 g/day while the same 
genotype averages 436 g/ day on the Laikipia ranches, 620 g/day at Abernossa, and 914 g/day 
on the best Laikipia ranch. Thereafter, although direct comparisons are complicated by 
differences in energy required for maintenance, the rate at which animals gain weight in the 
different systems is approximately the same. In Ethiopia, Nicholson (1984) has calculated that 
the approximate energy costs to raise a 450 kg mature steer from grass alone are 35 000 MJ to 
reach maturity as a 3-year old animal and 63 500 MJ to reach maturity as a 5-year old. 
The potential of pastoral systems 
Pastoralists and calves compete for milk. Most pastoral systems are characterised by high 
animal offtake despite traditional theories about the unwillingness of pastoralists to sell their 
animals. The Borana, for example, sell at least 10% of their herd each year and another 8% is 
consumed as fallen or slaughtered meat (Negussie Tilahun, 1984). This pattern of offtake is 
common to other East African pastoral systems. 
Increasingly, the income generated by animal sales is being used to purchase grain to 
supplement the pastoralists' diet. Up to 40% of the income derived from cattle sales by the 
pastoral Borana is used to purchase grain or grain equivalents (Negussie Tilahun, 1984). Their 
subsistence diet is summarised in Table 6. 
Table 6. The diet of the Borana: requirements and availability. 
Energy and protein source kg protein/ha/yr MJ GE/ha/yr 
Animal products directly consumed 1.34 117 
Vegetable products purchaseda 0.34 64 
Total available 1.68 181 
Total required 1.10 183 
a1983/84 animal to grain price ratios, i.e. kg liveweight: kg grain, range from 2.0 to 2.4. 
Figures do not include sugar, tea and coffee. 
Sources: Nicholson and Cossins (1984); Nicholson (pers. comm.); Agren and Gibson (1968); 
Negussie Tilahun (1984); Economist Measurement Guide (1983). 
In addition to meeting his own subsistence food requirements the Borana pastoralist sells 
produce worth about US$ 2.00/ ha/yr (or US$ 198 to 230 per family), 10% of which comes from 
butter, ghee and other sales. If there were no livestock sales, and no purchased grain or grain 
equivalent, then while the system would produce sufficient protein there would be an energy 
shortfall of approximately 40 MJ GE/ha/yr. 
Pastoral systems are thus partially dependent on food grain, a fact which raises the question: 
What would be the characteristics of the Borana pastoral system if it were commercialised, with 
nearly all the milk fed to the calves and with livestock offtake and sales maximised. Using 
existing Boran calving percentages and mortality figures potential animal weights1, and an 
offtake rate of 20%, the subsistence and income of the Borana would then be as given in Table 
7. 
1.    Potential animal weights are estimated weights with calves receiving all the milk. 
Table 7. The Borana pastoralists as market-oriented producers. 
  kg LW/ha/yr kg AP/ha/yr MJ GE/ha/yr US$/ha/yr 
Production 11.26 1.15 54   
Gross income from sales       5.13 
Cost of grain and other subsistence purchases       2.70 
Net income after subsistence needs are met       2.43 
Sources: Cossins (1984); Negussie Tilahun (1984). 
From their gross income of US$ 5.13/ha the Borana would need to buy at least 13.5 kg 
maize/ha/yr or its equivalent to meet protein and energy requirements. At May 1984 prices this 
would cost US$ 2.70/ha/yr, so that income after food subsistence needs were met would be 
US$ 2.43/ha/yr or US$ 238 to 279 per family. 
This income might be increased slightly by better range management, but there is little incentive 
for the Borana pastoralists to change their present production system. The comparison depends 
critically on the meat to grain price ratio but not on the relative levels of protein or energy 
production. The market-oriented approach would also yield only 40% of the energy produced by 
the pastoral system. 
At present the Borana system can more or less support itself in most years even if market 
supplies of grain are small; a change to market orientation would increase food security risks 
markedly, and increase reliance on external grain producers and market forces. Ethiopia 
annually receives large food aid grants to offset food crop deficits, which in 1984 probably 
exceeded 450 000 t. Sub-Saharan Africa imported 24.9 million tonnes of cereals in 1981 (FAO, 
1981), and such imports are increasing. From where, might argue the Borana, would the 40 000 
to 45 000 t of market grain come that they would require each year? Commercialisation of 
pastoral systems would also destroy the traditional patterns of income distribution, as it has 
done for the Somali and other pastoralists in recent years (Swift, 1979). The potential gains are 
not worth the certain risks. Is it possible, then, for the Borana and other pastoral groups to 
continue as rangeland dairy producers yet also to obtain much better calf growth rates, so that 
their system becomes a dairy-beef system? 
Improvements 
One of the main reasons for the different calf growth rates on commercial ranches and in the 
Borana system is the 312 kg of milk drunk by the pastoralists each lactation. This is equivalent 
to about 1164 MJ GE and 10.1 kg AP (Nicholson, pers. comm.) which could be replaced by 124 
kg DM of good legume hay (McDonald et al, 1975). Nicholson (1983) has calculated that Boran 
calves could have reached weights of 105 to 140 kg at 210 days had they had access to the 
additional energy denied them by milk offtake for humans. 
Some Borana families have already begun to cultivate small grain plots in the rangelands (450 
to 650 mm bimodal rainfall). This attempt to produce rather than purchase supplementary food 
grain for humans could be combined with the production of a forage legume, to provide a good-
quality supplement for animals. The legume crop would also provide residual soil N for 
subsequent food crops, in addition to an estimated 3–5 t/family/yr of animal manure that is 
readily available from Borana encampments where the night enclosures are cleaned out daily. 
The animal manure contains at least 1% N which adds 600–1000 kg grain/ha to present yields, 
if applied at about 2 t DM/ha (de Ridder, pers. comm.). 
The general idea of forage crop production in rangeland areas is not new. The Muguga 
research station in Kenya has produced 6 t DM/ha/yr of forage sorghum from a rainfall of 220 
mm per crop season (Potter, 1979). The supplementation of animals in other arid African 
environments has also been the subject of a number of experiments. The specific notion of 
introducing a forage legume to support an additional cereal crop and to supplement calf growth 
during the critical birth-to-210-day period in a pastoral system is a new slant on an old idea, as 
is the notion of pastoralists operating an improved dairy-beef enterprise. 
If a pastoral family could produce the 600 to 700 kg DM/year of legume required to supplement 
its calves, and could also produce 400 kg maize/year and sell its cull animals and steers, then a 
very favourable production model would emerge. The cereal crop would provide approximately 
0.34 kg protein/ha/yr and 58 MJ GE/ha/yr. A further 1.34 kg AP/ha/yr and 117 MJ GE/ha/yr 
would be provided by the consumption of milk and some meat, and an additional 1 kg 
maize/ha/yr would have to be purchased to provide all the energy required. This mode of 
production could provide in 7 to 9 years out of 10 a cash surplus after food subsistence needs 
were met, of US$ 490 to 575 for each Borana family (Bille, 1982). 
Not only could this form of production provide a cash income twice that which might be earned 
by present subsistence or theoretical commercial production, but the pastoral system would in 
most years continue to produce directly all the protein and 80% of the energy required by the 
pastoral population. In Africa today this is crucial. 
Many improvements proposed for pastoral systems run into the problem of equitable income 
distribution. Traditional pastoral systems handled this fairly well in the past: the demands for 
labour for herding or watering led to the sharing out of a labour-poor but cattle-rich family's 
animals to labour-rich but cattle-poor families who, in exchange for their labour, obtained milk 
and meat. This worked well at a subsistence level where the difference between rich and poor 
was defined in terms of capital rather than income. However, a change to market-oriented 
production provides the motive for a rich pastoralist to retain direct control over his animals, and 
labour-saving aids such as engine-driven water pumps, and even fencing, would provide the 
means to do so. Development and change can often lead to income inequities and poverty; it 
may therefore be important to retain a subsistence- and resource-sharing orientation amongst 
pastoralists. 
Prospects for development 
Most of the improvements attempted in East African pastoral areas to date have been aimed at 
improving existing patterns of resource use and rangeland management. For example, 
additional water points can provide a more uniform access to grazing resources. 
However, production data presented to date, and the ecological evidence accumulated 
throughout East Africa, do not demonstrate that pastoralists are bad range managers, or that 
pastoral areas are deteriorating and productivity is declining (Cossins, 1984). It has been 
suggested that very little increase in production could be attained in the Borana system by 
introducing other forms of grazing management (Bille, pers. comm.), and it is foolish to talk 
about de-stocking in order to increase individual animal productivity and unit area productivity, 
or about finding ways to syphon-off pastoral populations to alternative areas and enterprises. 
There is no pastoral system in East Africa today where the animal/people ratio is high enough to 
provide anything but a subsistence living; removing animals simply creates an impoverished 
population. 
The control of pandemic disease is one improvement that is now easily introduced through 
vaccination programmes. Such control provides better security of production. 
A recent study in West Africa (Breman and de Wit, 1983) showed soil nutrients to be a more 
important limiting factor on rangeland productivity than water, in areas where rainfall exceeded 
300 mm. This might also be the case in some East African rangelands. Work in Zambia has 
shown that 3 years' application of nitrogen fertilizer changed a Hyparrhenia sward into a more 
productive Star grass(Aletris farinosa) sward which persisted for some years, and which could 
be maintained by further periodic fertilizer application (Potter, 1979). However, the economics of 
fertilizer use on rangelands are very doubtful. 
Marketing is rarely a major constraint. Milk offtake in the Borana system, for example, is already 
high, and further increases will be limited by constraints on production such as rate of growth. 
The present marketing system also appears to be relatively efficient, and trading margins are 
not excessive. Increasing prices may increase the income of pastoralists, but will not increase 
offtake. 
Intensification of production, by increasing calf growth rates while retaining milk offtake and 
subsistence independence, appears to be the best bet for pastoral systems. In this way pastoral 
systems, which are already very productive in terms of supporting people and providing a cash 
income, might be made even more so. Even so, it is sobering to note that African pastoralists 
will never be well off, in a very modest western sense, unless there are fewer of them per unit 
area, or unless some completely unforeseen intervention, such as has happened to the 
suddenly oil-rich pastoralists of the Middle East, occurs. 
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Summary 
COMMERCIAL IMPORTS of dairy products into sub-Saharan Africa increased sixfold over the 
last decade, reaching US$ 707 million net in 1981 in addition to US$ 140 million worth of dairy 
products received as food aid. The subcontinent now imports roughly 30% of its total milk 
consumption. These imports are not evenly distributed: West and central Africa import 46% and 
57% of their needs respectively while East Africa imports 13%. 
This paper describes the development of African dairy imports and highlights the factors that 
have caused their recent tremendous increase. The role of national policies with their objectives 
and instruments, and possible effects, are discussed and the paper gives a brief assessment of 
how further research may help solve some of the problems that have arisen. 
It is obvious that some countries have an alarming dependence on dairy imports, particularly in 
the form of food aid. No single reason is readily apparent but, in some countries, national 
policies have been to blame. In many countries, dairy imports are likely to discourage domestic 
milk production, particularly where there is direct competition between the production of re-
constituted milk from imported milk powder and butter oil, and the local production of fresh milk. 
However, in the absence of data on milk prices and reliable production statistics, no firm 
conclusions can be reached for the subcontinent. In-depth studies of individual countries and 
the effects of their governments' policies for the dairy sector are recommended. 
Introduction 
The fact that imports exist in sub-Saharan Africa should not in itself be a source of unease. 
Economic theory provides some clear arguments to show that external trade policies based on 
the principle of comparative advantage can enhance human welfare in a country, even if 
substantial imports of certain products occur. However, there tends to be more concern over 
imports of basic foodstuffs. Governments hesitate to expose their countries to the uncertainties 
of highly volatile international markets in basic products, particularly foodstuffs, whose supply 
can affect political stability. Moreover, imports have to be offset by equivalent exports to 
maintain a balance of foreign exchange. If a country faces an increasing dependence on 
imported food at a time of acute or latent shortage of foreign exchange, then imports may pose 
severe problems. 
Over the last decade there has been a tremendous increase in dairy imports into sub-Saharan 
Africa and, in most of the countries concerned, there has also been a chronic shortage of 
foreign exchange. Given the importance of dairy products, both for human consumption and as 
a source of farm income, it is vital to study the causes and effects of this development. There is 
a considerable amount of published literature on the theory of international trade and food policy 
(see for example Heidhues, 1979; Oyejide, 1983) and there have been several studies of the 
related problem of cereal imports and policy reactions (McIntire, 1981; Morrison, 1984; 
Huddleston, 1984). However, there has been no published study of dairy imports into sub-
Saharan Africa (see also Eicher and Baker, 1982). This article attempts to correct this 
deficiency. 
Increases in dairy imports into sub-Saharan Africa 
Background 
Commercial imports of dairy products into sub-Saharan Africa have increased steadily since 
1960. According to FAO Trade Yearbooks they rose in value from US$ 43 million in 1960 to 
US$ 113 million in 1970 and then to US$ 680 million in 1980. The increase continued in 
1981(US$ 707 million) but appears to have come to a halt in 1982 and 1983 (Figure 1). In 1980, 
sub-Saharan African countries spent approximately 5% of their total revenues from agricultural, 
forestry and fishery exports on imports of dairy products. Dried and condensed milk made up 
two thirds of the total dairy imports in 1960 but accounted for almost 90% from 1970 to 1983. 
This indicates that there has been a shift from imports of items such as cream, yoghurt and 
cheese, to imports of the more basic dairy products. 
Figure 1. Value of net dairy imports into sub-Saharan Africa, 1972–82. 
 
Non-commercial imports 
Before the commercial import figures are broken down into regional groupings and countries, 
the role of non-commercial imports of dairy products, in the form of food aid, must be 
mentioned. The major items of food aid are skimmed milk powder and butter oil which can be 
recombined to form liquid milk. In 1981, sub-Saharan African countries received as food aid a 
total of about 88 000 t of dried skimmed milk, and 9000 t each of butter oil and other dairy 
products (FAO, 1984). This is equal to almost 770 000 t of liquid milk equivalent (LME)1. These 
imports are provided free of charge by the donor, although the recipient country sometimes has 
to contribute to shipping and/or distribution costs. Valued at current prices of commercial 
imports (c.i.f.)2, dairy food aid to sub-Saharan Africa in 1981 was equivalent to almost US$ 140 
million, or 16% of the total value of all dairy imports (Figure 1)3. 
  
1.    For the conversion of dairy products into milk equivalents, see FAO (1978a). 
2.    The c.i.f. import price is inclusive of the cost of insurance and freight. 
3.    Butter oil has been valued at 1.2 times the import (c.i.f.) price for butter according to the 
price ratio set for the GATT minimum prices (GATT, 1983). 'Other dairy products' have been 
valued as equivalent to the price of condensed milk. A weighted regional average has been 
used for those countries and commodities where no price for commercial imports for the year in 
question is available.  
  
Detailed statistics on food aid are available for the period 1977 to 1981, when food aid 
increased in volume by almost 140% in LME against an increase of 43% for commercial 
imports. On average the share of food aid in total dairy imports (in LME) rose from 17% in 1977 
to 25% in 1981 and 23% in 1982. Both the quantities of dairy products imported commercially 
and as food aid have to be considered when the effects of imports on domestic prices, 
production and consumption are analysed. However, since food aid can be given in various 
ways, e.g. with special conditions attached to its use or as a direct contribution to domestic 
supplies, the precise effects of each type of donation have to be carefully analysed for each 
country. 
Dairy import statistics by region 
It would be of interest to study dairy imports by ecological zones, but this is not possible given 
the form of the available data. Instead, all sub-Saharan African countries have been grouped 
into four regions i.e. West, central, East and southern Africa. As can be seen in Figure 2, West 
African countries are responsible for most (about 55 to 60%) commercial imports. The other 
three regions share the remaining 40% more or less equally, although East Africa increased its 
share from about 5% to 20% in the last decade. There is a different regional pattern for food aid. 
East Africa receives almost 50% of all food aid deliveries to sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 3), while 
the share of West Africa fluctuates between 25 and 33% of the total. 
Figure 2. Commercial dairy imports into sub-Saharan Africa by region. 
  
Source: FAO Trade Yearbooks (various years). 
Figure 3. Dairy food aid imports into sub-Saharan Africa by region. 
  
Source: FAO, 1984. 
Further information can be obtained by comparing regional dairy imports per caput. As can be 
seen from Table 1, only in southern Africa was the volume of commercial dairy imports per 
caput more or less stable from 1972 to 1982. East Africa showed the biggest increase in 
commercial imports per caput, from 0.62 kg/head for 1972 to 3.87 kg/head for 1982. Combined 
food aid and commercial dairy imports per caput increased by 104% from 1977 to 1982 in East 
Africa. With 8.77 kg/head in 1982, West Africa imports most dairy products per caput. 
  
Table 1. Net dairy imports per caput by the regions of sub-Saharan Africa, 1972, 1977 and 
1982. 
Year Type of Imports 
Net dairy imports (kg LME/caput) 
West Africa 
Central 
Africa 
East Africa 
Southern 
Africa 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
1972 
Commercial 4.12 2.71 0.62 5.25 3.00 
Food aid n.a.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1977 
Commercial 7.59 3.18 1.70 5.91 4.91 
Food aid 0.71 0.81 1.60 0.82 1.00 
Total 8.30 3.99 3.30 6.73 5.91 
1982 
Commercial 7.78 4.29 3.87 5.52 5.78 
Food aid 0.99 1.36 2.86 2.36 1.77 
Total 8.77 5.65 6.73 7.88 7.55 
1n.a. = not available. 
Sources: Calculations based on FAO Trade Yearbooks (various years), FAO (1978a); FAO 
(1984) and World Bank (1983). 
The dependence on commercial dairy imports and food aid is best illustrated by comparison 
with total milk consumption i.e. total domestic milk production plus total dairy imports. Although 
in general milk production data for African countries are not very reliable, changes in import 
consumption ratios may be used, if interpreted cautiously. These are presented in Table 2 for 
1971–73 and 1981–83. 
Table 2. Contribution of commercial, food aid and total imports of dairy products to total milk 
consumption for the regions of sub-Saharan Africa, 1971–73 and 1981–83. 
Period Type of Imports 
Dairy imports/milk consumption 
West Africa 
Central 
Africa 
East Africa 
Southern 
Africa 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
1971–73 
Commercial 0.26 0.33 0.01 0.23 0.11 
Food aid n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1981–83 
Commercial 0.41 0.39 0.07 0.25 0.21 
Food aid 0.05 0.13 0.06 0.10 0.06 
Total 0.46 0.52 0.13 0.35 0.27 
Note: Consumption is calculated as all liquid milk production plus total imports. All figures are 
the respective 3-year averages. 
Sources: Calculations based on FAO Production Yearbooks, FAO Trade Yearbooks, FAO 
(1978a) and FAO (1984). 
The overall dependence on dairy imports was highest in West and central Africa, where imports 
comprised about 50% of total consumption. In East Africa local milk producers provide most of 
the dairy products consumed, but the increase in the ratio between commercial imports and 
consumption between 1972 and 1982 was as large for East Africa as for West Africa. 
Furthermore, East African countries are more dependent on food aid. In two thirds of East 
African countries food aid accounted for 40% or more of total dairy imports in 1982, whereas in 
other regions less than two fifths of countries fall into this category. Five out of the 45 sub-
Saharan African countries depend on food aid for more than 50% of their total dairy imports. 
Share of total dairy imports in total consumption 
When the food needs, incomes and dairy imports of African countries are examined more 
closely, three broad groupings can be discerned. 
There are nine countries (Benin, Congo, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, 
Togo and Zaire) with less than 20 kg milk consumption per caput that import more than 60% of 
their requirements. These countries are highly dependent on dairy imports. However, with the 
exception of Ghana and Sierra Leone, all meet at least 90% of the total calorie requirement of 
their populations (World Bank, 1983). Dairy imports do not, therefore, appear to play a crucial 
role in overall human nutrition in these countries. Ghana and Sierra Leone, with lower nutritional 
levels, are not only dependent on dairy imports but more than 30% of these imports are in the 
form of food aid. Benin (in common with Central African Republic, Lesotho and Somalia) shows 
the atypical feature of a high share of dairy food aid in total milk consumption. For the majority 
of all countries the proportion of dairy food aid decreases with a rising share of total dairy 
imports in total consumption. 
Congo, Ivory Coast, Liberia and Nigeria are highly import-dependent yet have a relatively low 
per caput consumption. However, all these countries have comparatively high average incomes, 
i.e. their GNP per caput exceeds US$ 400. Most dairy imports are purchased rather than 
received as food aid. 
The third group comprises nine countries—Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, 
Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda. Each of these countries has a GNP per caput of less than US$ 
300 and receives more than 30% of all dairy imports as food aid. In all of these countries, with 
the exception of Somalia, more than 80% of the population lives in rural areas. 
It is clear that sub-Saharan Africa cannot easily, or quickly, meet its demand for milk from 
domestic supplies. 
Some potential influences 
Population growth 
The human population of sub-Saharan Africa increased annually by an average of 2.9% from 
1970 to 1980 (World Bank, 1981). With all other factors remaining constant, and assuming no 
changes in demand caused by changes in age distribution, demand for milk would have 
increased at the same rate. However, commercial dairy imports (in LME) into sub-Saharan 
Africa increased by an annual average of 9.9% over the same period, indicating that factors 
other than population must have been influential. 
Urbanisation 
Rapid urbanisation is widely assumed to boost the demand for imports of all food products. The 
mechanism behind this is the change of status from one of rural subsistence to that of the urban 
dweller whose milk demand, given the present stage of agricultural development and 
infrastructure in many sub-Saharan African countries, cannot be met by domestic supply. In 
other words, people move to the cities but their milk source does not, The World Bank (1981) 
reports that urban populations in sub-Saharan Africa have increased overall by 6% a year, and 
by 8.5% a year for 35 major capitals. However, there is no formula available to translate this 
growth into a growth of demand for dairy imports. 
Income 
Incomes in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa increased by an average of 0.8% over the last 
10 years (World Bank, 1981). It can be assumed that part or all of this additional income was 
spent on food, and on milk products in particular. The increase in demand for milk due to rising 
incomes can be estimated from the income elasticity of quantitative demand for milk which was 
calculated to be 0.68 for sub-Saharan Africa in the mid-1970s (FAO, 1978b). This means that 
the demand for milk increases at about two-thirds the rate of the increase in total income. Solely 
in terms of the income elasticity of demand, an annual growth rate in demand for milk of about 
0.54% could thus be expected. However, there are several complicating factors because a 
population is composed of individuals, not averages. High-income consumers differ from those 
on a low income, just as urban consumers differ from rural, and consumer preferences can 
change over time. However, the figure does give an indication of the relationship between 
income and demand for dairy products. 
Consumer prices 
The effect of price changes on the demand for milk is well defined by economic theory. Rising 
prices for milk will, under normal circumstances, lead to a decrease in demand and vice 
versa. The extent of the change is determined by the price elasticity of quantitative demand. 
Cross price elasticities, which indicate the effects of changes in the prices of commodities that 
are complementary to or substitutes for milk, can also be defined. However, in practice there are 
several problems. 
Milk can hardly be considered a homogeneous product. Qualitative differences with regard to fat 
content, purity and, above all, freshness and taste, may well lead to substantial price 
differences. In many countries reconstituted milk (from milk powder and butter oil) cannot 
compete at the same price as fresh milk. In many countries the marketing channels are very 
diverse. Often petty traders compete with cooperatives and/or parastatals, and each tends to 
provide different services to the consumers. Thus, differences in both the level of service and 
the quality of milk can have an important influence on price structures. 
A special problem is the role of rural producer-consumers. In a system where a significant, if not 
dominant, share of the milk produced is used for the farmer's own subsistence, it is sometimes 
hard to determine what his reaction to changing prices will be. The ratio between milk and 
cereal prices plays an important role in this respect. Again, very little is known about the size, or 
even the sign (positive or negative), of the cross price elasticity. 
Producer prices 
Many of the points raised above also apply to producer prices. Again, the economic parameters 
describing the reaction of subsistence producers are either unknown or incomplete. Even 
overall estimates of aggregate price elasticities of milk supply are rarely available. There have 
been efforts to identify the effects of several non-price factors influencing milk supply, and to 
establish some causal links (McClintock, 1984). However, the results are not encouraging, and 
only guesses can be made about what caused the decline in African milk production per caput 
of 0.4% per year over the last decade (see Anteneh, 1984). There is a widespread opinion that 
milk producers respond significantly to rising prices. With regard to the 'direction' of the effects, 
economic theory predicts that milk supply will probably increase when the price-cost ratio for 
dairy production compares favourably with other production alternatives. More detailed case 
studies may allow us to draw further conclusions. Unsatisfying as this may be, it is maintained 
here that the price mechanism plays a crucial role in determining both the demand for, and the 
supply of, milk. 
Foreign exchange 
The availability of foreign currency to pay for imports is one of the factors that influences imports 
most directly. In the last decade, balance-of-payment deficits have increased in most sub-
Saharan African countries (World Bank, 1981), and this should have curbed rather than 
stimulated dairy imports. However, many African countries have resorted to market interference, 
and to controls on exchange rate and currency. Government policy has a decisive influence in 
this area, but for many countries the limit for expenditures on dairy imports does not yet seem to 
have been reached. 
Food aid 
There are two ways in which dairy food aid influences total dairy imports. First, the decision to 
supply food aid to a particular country is not influenced by the market price for milk in that 
country; in this respect the availability of food aid must be considered an independent variable. 
Second, an offer of food aid may well change a country's demand for commercial imports by 
either complementing them or partly substituting for them. 
Only general remarks can be made about the factors which influence the availability of dairy 
food aid. The EC, the most important donor to African countries, has since 1979 operated within 
an annual target of 150 000 t of skimmed milk powder and 45 000 t of butter oil. This is 
allocated to various developing countries and aid organisations or to the FAO World Food 
Programme (CEC, 1983). There are various forms of dairy food aid. The most frequent are 
'food-for-work' programmes, dairy development projects and unconditional or 'emergency' 
shipments. In all cases the recipient country has to 'apply' for food aid in that a political 
agreement or contract is required. 
No statistics are available to show the relative importance of these different forms of dairy food 
aid to sub-Saharan African countries. The World Food Programme is committed to dairy 
projects in nine African countries (FAO/WFP, 1983) but other organisations also cover dairy 
development, e.g. the EC donations to Mali. Figure 1 shows that the share of food aid in sub-
Saharan Africa's total dairy imports increased from 7% in 1977 to 25% in 1981. The present 
dependence of individual countries has already been described. It is hard to foresee whether 
the EC's expressed intention to cut back on dairy food aid (The Economist, 1984) will stimulate 
commercial imports or reduce consumption. There may even be a rise in African milk production 
with the removal of the disincentive effect sometimes ascribed to food aid. 
International prices 
Relative price differences between individual countries, when translated into absolute price 
differences (by the exchange rate), are the driving force behind international trade. Relative 
price differences are due to differing patterns of demand and supply and are relatively constant. 
When many countries trade in a commodity, countries trading in small quantities have little 
influence on the world market price that emerges. This lack of influence of 'small' countries 
certainly applies to sub-Saharan African countries and their role in the world markets for milk 
products. Assuming no government interference and ample foreign exchange, the ratio between 
domestic and international prices determines the amount of net imports, ensuring the balance 
between supply and demand and adjusting domestic prices towards world market levels. 
Two amendments to this basic mechanism must be made. First, milk and dairy products are 
traded mainly in processed forms. With milk the processing charges must be taken into account, 
unlike wheat for which one can directly compare the import (c.i.f.) prices and the price on the 
domestic market adjusted for transport costs, storage etc. Although fresh milk is the major 
domestic dairy product it is rarely traded internationally, and so any comparison of international 
and domestic prices has to use recombined milk as a substitute. The following example may 
illustrate the case: skimmed milk powder at a price (c.i.f.) of US$ 1000/t and butter oil at US$ 
2500/t can be recombined with water in the proportions of 10% skimmed milk powder, 3.5% 
butter oil and 86.5% water. Allowing for a processing cost of 10%, the equivalent 'border' price 
for recombined milk is US$ 0.21/litre. Translated into domestic currency at the current exchange 
rate and adjusted for transport costs etc., this border price, when compared with domestic 
prices, determines whether imports will flow in or not. A further complication is that consumers 
usually recognize a quality difference in favour of fresh milk, and this means that the domestic 
price for fresh milk can be somewhat higher than the border price of recombined milk, and still 
remain competitive. 
The second amendment to the general theory concerns the effect of government policy. Often 
heavily distorted exchange rates, import duties, import monopolies and other regulations 
interfere with the free market assumed in the above example. Because of this interference, any 
interpretation of the international to domestic price ratio must be adjusted to allow for these 
policy distortions. 
Increases in dairy imports into sub-Saharan Africa are thus caused by a variety of factors. 
Population growth, urbanisation, income and consumer prices are potential influences on the 
demand side. The effects of changes in producer prices are probably the main influence on the 
supply side. Foreign exchange, food aid and international prices also have major direct effects 
on dairy imports. 
The effect of these various influences can be summarised as follows. On the demand side, all 
factors contribute to rising imports to differing degrees. With regard to prices, both on the 
demand and supply sides, more analysis is needed in order to judge better their causes and 
effects. In many African countries prices have been depressed by government policies, and this 
would further increase the demand for imports. Foreign exchange limitations do not seem to 
have slowed the increase in total dairy imports, whereas availability of food aid and depressed 
international prices for dairy products appear to have contributed to the increase. Although 
varying widely, government policies will have influenced all of these factors and could even 
have changed the direction of their impact. Some evidence about the potential role of 
governments in the development of dairy imports in the last decade is given below. 
On a sub-continental scale there are few data to quantify the factors influencing international 
markets. However, an auxiliary calculation, which includes some trend values to allow for 
different reasons for growth in commercial dairy imports, is given below. Population growth and 
rising incomes are taken as exogenous factors. No empirical data are available for price 
changes, government policies and other factors such as shifts in consumer preferences. Thus, 
the total change in dairy imports (ΔM) is explained below by a term for changes in population 
(ΔN) plus a term for changes in disposable income per caput (ΔY) minus a term for changes in 
domestic milk production (ΔQ) plus a residual term (e) comprising all other factors. 
The resulting equation is 
 
The influence of the single factors is weighted by the rate of self-sufficiency (RSS) which is the 
share of domestic supply in total dairy consumption. Changes in per caput incomes are 
multiplied by the coefficient of their assumed influence on dairy demand, i.e. the income 
elasticity of milk demand (η). Table 3 gives results of the calculations for countries listed in order 
of the magnitude of the residual term. The higher a country ranks in Table 3, the greater are the 
influences of 'other factors' (i.e. other than population, income and changes in domestic 
production) on dairy imports. 
Table 3. Indicators of potential policy influence on dairy imports in 29 countries of sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
Country Regiona 
Ecological 
zoneb 
Average 
annual 
growth in 
importsc 
(%) 
Share of food 
aid in total 
importsd 
(%) 
Average 
annual 
growth in per 
caput 
consumptione 
(%) 
Residual 
termf 
Zambia S SH/SA –15.0* 0.32 –10.3* +19.2* 
Sierra Leone W H/SH +10.2 0.35 + 9.3* +10.0* 
Ivory Coast W H/SH +14.4 0.01 + 8.7 + 7.6 
Somalia E A/– +80.5* 0.49 –14.0* + 6.4* 
Congo C H/SH + 8.9 0.08 + 9.8* + 5.4* 
Togo W SH/H +12.9 0.18 + 5.9 + 4.6 
Nigeria W SH/SA +15.4 0.01 + 6.3 + 4.5 
Liberia W H/– + 6.5 0.10 + 3.3 + 3.2 
Niger W A/– –0.7 0.25 + 3.2* + 3.0* 
Mauritania W A/– + 5.5 0.35 + 1.5 + 2.3 
Uganda E SH/H –1.6 0.43 –0.9 + 2.2 
Malawi S SH/SA + 1.5 0.41 + 2.8 + 1.6 
Cent. Afr. Rep. C H/SH + 3.0 0.30 + 2.0 + 1.6 
Burundi C HL/SH +35.0 0.40 + 2.8 + 0.4 
Upper Volta W SA/SH +36.2 0.36 + 8.0 + 0.3 
Benin W SH/SA +12.2 0.39 + 1.7 + 0.2 
Ethiopia E A/HL +21.3 0.40 –0.2 –0.2 
Senegal W SA/A + 5.7 0.19 –0.4 –0.3 
Mali W A/SA –0.1 0.32 + 1.2 –0.3 
Lesotho S n.a. +10.1 0.51 + 3.3 –1.2 
Guinea W SH/H + 3.2 0.24 –2.5 –2.7 
Ghana W H/SH –2.9 0.30 –5.4 –3.4 
Rwanda C HL/SH –3.2 0.95 –2.8 –4.3 
Madagascar S SH/H –5.6 0.31 –5.4 –4.3 
Cameroon C H/SH + 8.5 0.17 –1.0 –4.6 
Zimbabwe S SA/SH +47.2 0.32 –5.6 –5.1 
Sudan E A/SA + 18.8 0.40 –6.9* –8.1 
Zaire C H/SH –4.2 0.16 –9.2* –8.5 
Tanzania E SH/SA + 0.4 0.51 –8.6* –10.1* 
* Figures marked thus are considered particularly unreliable. 
a C = central, S = southern, E = East and W = West Africa. 
b SH = subhumid, H = humid, SA = semi-arid, A = arid, HL = highlands (see Jahnke,1982, p. 
233). 
c Commercial dairy imports only, from 1972–74 (av.) to 1980–82 (av). 
d Average of 1980–82 figures. 
e Consumption = domestic production + commercial imports, for the same period as under note 
c. 
f The residual term is the term 'e' in Equation 1; period as for note c. 
Sources: FAO Production Yearbooks, FAO Trade Yearbooks, FAO (1978a; 1984) and World 
Bank (1981; 1983). 
For example, Nigeria ranks in the upper quarter of Table 3. Commercial dairy imports into 
Nigeria grew by an average of 15.4% annually even without food aid. Per caput milk 
consumption increased by 6.3% per year, mainly due to the increase in imports. The residual 
term of +4.5 indicates that population, income and milk production growth in Nigeria account for 
only a 10.9% increase in dairy imports. The remaining increase of 4.5% must be due to pricing 
policy, exchange rate controls, or long-term shifts in demand e.g. substitution of sheep and goat 
milk for cow's milk. In Cameroon the figures suggest that commercial imports of dairy products 
would have increased by another 4.6% annually if policy and other factors had not curbed their 
growth. Per caput consumption declined by 1.0% on average. 
Table 3 shows that in 25 out of the 29 countries listed the change in per caput milk 
consumption, whether positive or negative, was in accordance with the sign of the residual term 
(e). In two thirds of the countries, growth in imports matched a growth in per caput consumption. 
The importance of dairy imports for consumption, and of national policies for the development of 
dairy imports, is underlined by these results. 
Some possible effects of increased dairy imports 
The complex interactions between prices, demand and supply in domestic and world markets 
make it difficult to distinguish causes and effects. On the demand side, population, income 
growth and urbanisation can be taken as independent variables (although the availability of 
cheap imported foodstuffs may itself have stimulated migration to the cities). In general, 
increases in dairy imports have increased the total supply of milk and dairy products in importing 
countries, thereby halting, or even reversing, upward trends in prices. Consumers in general 
have benefited from this effect. 
Declining producer prices 
In the face of declining or stagnant prices, producers can be expected to cut back on dairy 
production and shift their resources to the production of more profitable items. However, many 
producers may stay in milk production simply because they have no production alternatives. 
Similarly, it could be argued that technical innovations, e .g. improvements in management and 
breeding stocks, would lower production costs and offset the effect of decreasing dairy prices. In 
Europe, for example, the EC reports an annual average increase in milk yield per cow of 2.2% 
since 1974, and 3.8% for 1981/82, which is claimed to reflect improved herd structure and 
quality of milk cows (CEC, 1984). For sub-Saharan Africa, however, virtually no increase in 
average yield was observed over the last decade, either per productive animal or per total herd. 
The only regional exception was West Africa which showed a modest improvement in dairy 
production (Anteneh, 1984). 
Unfortunately, the availability and quality of price statistics are very poor for most African 
countries. It is therefore impossible to quantify, on a sub-Saharan or regional scale, the impact 
of dairy imports on domestic price levels and production. There have been cases where local 
milk processing plants have stopped collecting fresh milk because they found it more economic 
to sell reconstituted milk from cheap milk powder and butter oil imports4. There may be a circular 
effect, with imports depressing local production and this generating even greater demand for 
imports. Such an effect will approach an equilibrium if prices are not fixed. 
4.    The dangers of dairy imports are discussed, for example, by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Tanzania (1977). 
Balance of payments 
The level of dairy imports is directly affected by the availability of foreign exchange and 
variations in the exchange rate. At the same time, growing expenditure on dairy imports poses 
an additional burden on a country's balance of payments and tends to weaken its currency. The 
total impact on the economy is not easily quantified, but one can compare the value of net 
imports of dairy products with total export revenues to get an indication of the burden placed on 
the balance of payments. It becomes obvious that there are great variations among the 
countries for which data are available. In those five countries (Burkina Faso, Benin, Mauritania, 
Senegal and Somalia) that spend a relatively large percentage of total export earnings on dairy 
imports (5% or more) it is possible that imports have displaced expenditures on long-term 
development projects. 
The role of national policies 
It is generally accepted that national policies play a critical role in livestock development (World 
Bank, 1981). Not only do they modify the overall economic environment for agricultural 
production, but they often interfere directly with the production processes, marketing channels, 
and consumption, as well as with external trade. 
The use of the word 'policy' requires some explanation. In many cases it is necessary to 
distinguish between deliberate policies for which governments design effective instruments, and 
policies which governments publicly espouse but which they know will not be effective. Another 
distinction needs to be made between policies which are clearly defined and targeted to dairy 
imports, consumption or production, and other policies, such us the setting of the exchange 
rate, which are not specially directed towards dairy imports but which may have indirect effects 
on them. Finally, there is the distinction between policies which are consistent in their effects 
and those which are not, regardless of the government's original intention. A government may 
make decisions in two areas which then have a perfectly consistent though unintended 
influence on a related third area. Consider, for example, a government that devalues its 
currency in order to comply with IMF or IDA credit requirements, and decides to impose a duty 
on beef exports to increase its tax revenues. By curbing imports and reducing the profitability of 
beef production the government produces a consistent policy that also stimulates dairy 
production. 
Objectives of government interference 
As Bates (1983) puts it: "Bluntly, food policy appears to represent a form of political 
settlement—one designed to bring peaceful relations between African governments and their 
urban constituents". If true, this attitude is in marked contrast to that in most developed 
countries, especially in the EC, where the overall objective has usually been to support 
agricultural incomes (Heidhues, 1979). 
For African countries it seems appropriate to assume that agricultural policies favour the 
consumer rather than the producers5. What are the possible objectives behind such policies? 
Three types of objectives can be mentioned: governments aim to survive; they also have 
general objectives in the area of food policy; and they may have certain, specific objectives 
relating to dairy imports. 
5.    Nevertheless, careful examination of existing policies is required, as can be seen, 
for example, from von Braun and de Haen (1983) who showed that agricultural policy in 
Egypt was much less at the cost of agriculture than was generally expected. 
Food policy is often crucial to government aims because it has direct effects on the population 
and their goodwill. Therefore, the objectives of food policy, whether to secure food supply, to 
increase self-sufficiency or to support special groups like city dwellers, are often closely related 
to government self-interest. 
Not all policy objectives are necessarily consistent with each other: they may also be in conflict. 
Often one objective can only be reached at the expense of others. To try and provide both 
attractive farm incomes and low food prices—without imposing huge costs on the national 
budget— is a common example of one objective being sacrificed for the sake of others. 
In the field of dairy import policy six common objectives may be distinguished: to meet certain 
milk consumption targets; to generate tariff revenues; to protect producers against world market 
competition; to save foreign exchange; to stimulate domestic dairy development; and to realize 
the benefits of free trade. The starting point for the following descriptions relate to a country that 
is a net importer of dairy products and whose government has no policy on such imports. 
The milk consumption objective 
Any increase in milk consumption in a poor country could substantially improve overall nutrition, 
whether it be that of vulnerable groups like children or pregnant women or that of the whole 
population. A government wanting to increase milk consumption will have to do so by way of 
increased imports if domestic production is insufficient or if market links between producers and 
consumers are weak. The major instruments used to stimulate imports are a reduction in tariffs, 
import subsidies and (subsidised) state trading and distribution. Alternatively, the government 
can request food aid. Depending on the instruments used there will be some burden on the 
national budget. 
The tariff revenue objective 
If dairy imports already exist, the government can try to make them contribute to the national 
budget. By imposing an import tariff this will create the desired revenue at the expense of the 
consumers and/or the external suppliers. Since budgetary considerations are the major force 
behind such a policy, the economic effects on consumers and producers are given lower 
priority. There may be a contradiction, and consequent trade-offs, between this objective and a 
policy that sets consumption targets. 
The protection objective 
Tariffs to raise tax revenues increase domestic prices over world market prices, and thereby 
favour domestic production over imports. The same protective wall around local producers can 
also be erected by introducing quantitative restrictions, i.e. import quotas, or other non-tariff 
barriers such as quality requirements, port procedures and fees. In any case, the successful 
protection of domestic milk producers imposes a burden on consumers, either through higher 
consumer prices or through increased taxes that are needed to finance additional government 
compensation. The protection objective is not compatible with any objective that seeks 
increased consumer welfare. 
The foreign exchange objective 
A government's effort to save foreign exchange has similar effects. Dairy imports, unless they 
are in the form of food aid or can be paid for in local currency, can be reduced by the same 
instruments as those used to pursue the protection objective. The primary effects are the same. 
However, the secondary effects need to be analysed to see whether or not the stimulus to milk 
production increases the demand for foreign inputs and thus affects the foreign exchange 
balance. In some situations trade-offs occur between the protection and the foreign exchange 
and/or the tariff revenue objectives, although some of the instruments used may at first glance 
appear to serve all three objectives. 
The dairy development objective 
It may not be immediately clear how a government can develop the domestic dairy sector other 
than by reducing imports and increasing domestic prices. However, the dairy development 
objective can be pursued positively by a channelled increase in imports. There are two major 
strategies: the first is based on the assumption that dairy production needs a minimum level of 
marketing channels and processing facilities to get off the ground. Where production is 
scattered and insignificant, dairy imports can help create an infrastructure and stimulate 
demand at the same time. However, many reservations apply and such a policy will usually be 
only a short-term device. The second strategy is based on the same fundamental assumption 
but includes the concept of using revenues from food aid sales for investment. As in the Indian 
'Operation Flood', dairy food aid can be sold locally to generate funds for dairy development. 
The same procedure is possible with controlled commercial imports if the balance between 
domestic supply and demand results in prices above world market levels. It is clear that any 
such dairy development policy incorporates an array of policy instruments, with those affecting 
dairy imports being prominent. 
The free-trade-benefits objective 
In the 'free trade' theory, overall national welfare is considered to be maximised by the 
undistorted allocation of resources according to their economic value as expressed in 
international prices. According to the pure theory, governments should not interfere with dairy 
imports. 
However, there is a role for government policy which does not necessarily conflict with the 
principle of comparative advantage. For example, there may be reasons to offset price 
movements on the international markets that are not true indicators of the supply and demand 
situation, but merely reflections of other countries' protectionist policies. 
The instruments used to balance out these market defects, e.g. anti-dumping tariffs, will be of a 
transient nature. They may be supplemented by quality controls, price monitoring and other 
means to ensure fair competition. The difficulty in such an 'adjusted free trade' policy lies in the 
inherent temptation for governments to lapse into the protectionist stance they originally set out 
to combat. 
The major instruments and their effects 
Import subsidies 
Governments can improve milk consumption through import subsidies which can be targeted or 
non-targeted. A common example of an effort to meet milk consumption requirements of 
specific target groups is that of a school milk programme in which the government subsidises a 
particular group. If the government wants to subsidise milk consumption in general rather than 
that by school children in particular, it can simply subsidise all dairy imports with a fixed amount 
per tonne. However, even if the same amount of total imports is assumed in each case, the 
effects are quite different. 
The general subsidy will decrease domestic prices and thus have a disincentive effect on 
producers, whereas the special subsidy to a target group allows them to buy and consume milk 
that would not otherwise be consumed. The difference between a targeted and untargeted 
import subsidy is that the latter has disincentive effects on domestic production, whereas a 
targeting of import subsidy can avoid disincentives, or at least diminish them. 
A non-targeted subsidy effect can also be brought about by other countries subsidising their 
producers whereby world market prices decline. The implications are the same and, as with 
food aid, the government does not have to pay. This interpretation may well describe what has 
actually happened: depressed world market price levels, basically due to USA and EC dairy 
policies, have fuelled Africa's milk demand and dairy imports, thereby hampering the continent's 
dairy development efforts. 
Import tariff 
In economic terms a tariff has the opposite effects of an import subsidy. The consumers are the 
losers since milk consumption and real disposable income are reduced as a consequence of 
higher prices. However, producers benefit. 
Other aspects of government policy 
Many African governments have attempted to control trade in foodstuffs directly. They 
participate in, or even monopolise, import activities by setting up statal or parastatal 
organisations that often have far-reaching powers. It is hard to generalise about their effects 
since they can intervene in the market in many ways. Statal or parastatal organisations can be 
subsidised as well as taxed, can reap monopoly rents or supply isolated areas with high 
distribution costs at no extra expense. All these activities can substitute, complement or offset 
dairy import policies, and the eventual effects on production, consumption, trade and welfare 
are difficult to assess. 
In general, state trading tends to act against the market forces rather than to reinforce or 
complement them. Frequently, through state trading, governments pursue precisely those 
objectives which the market will not provide for. Keeping consumer prices at an artificially low 
level despite insufficient supply, or limiting imports in a similar situation, are common examples. 
This often means an overall decline in welfare. The answer to the question 'Who gains, who 
loses?' depends on the market situation and on the activity undertaken. The most obvious sign 
of the effects of state trading against the market forces is the existence of 'black', i.e. free, 
markets—a common feature of many African countries. 
Price policy is another important issue but it is too complex to be thoroughly covered here. In 
theory, almost all the listed objectives concerning dairy imports can be reached by setting 
producer or consumer prices. For example, by pushing the domestic milk price below world 
market levels, a government takes away any commercial incentive to import dairy products, and 
thereby saves foreign exchange. Any pricing policy, however, faces the major problem of 
actually controlling administered prices. Sub-Saharan African milk markets in particular, with 
their abundance of informal marketing channels and direct producer-consumer links, are almost 
impossible to control effectively. Both Kenya and Mali, to name but two of many possible 
examples, have at least one milk price with its respective marketing channel in addition to the 
official, controlled market price (FAO, 1981; 1983). 
Some examples of current policies 
Dairy import policies do not often feature in African governments' official statements. This is not 
surprising since they involve details which do not lend themselves to public speeches or election 
promises, and other products may be considered more important. The result is that information 
on specific objectives for dairy imports is rare. 
Thus, statistics on tariffs, trade regulations and marketing patterns are often hard to find; 
however, two approximations that are readily available are the relative importance of imports in 
the domestic dairy sector, and what proportion of these imports is commercial. Both variables 
are relatively high if the country has followed a policy of relatively open borders. The two criteria 
selected to identify a relatively open-border policy are whether the share of imports in total milk 
consumption is over 50%, and whether at least 65% of dairy imports are commercial (Table 4). 
An interesting pattern emerges. Other than the islands in the Indian Ocean, all 18 countries that 
meet these criteria are located along the West and central African coastline. Apart from 
Senegal, none of these countries' dairy imports seem to put a particularly large burden on their 
foreign exchange account. For Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal the World Bank (1983) states that 
they have a high or, in the case of Senegal, a medium distortion of the exchange rate, and this 
may have fuelled dairy imports. 
Table 4. Tentative indicators of an open-border policy with regard to dairy imports for 18 
countries of sub-Saharan Africa, 1980–82. 
  
Dairy imports as % of 
consumption 
Commercial dairy 
imports as % of total 
dairy imports 
Value of dairy imports 
as % of total export 
revenues 
Angola 51 84 2 
Cameroon 51 83 1 
C.A.R. 56 70 1 
Congo 82 92 1 
Gambia 68 75 n. a. 
Ghana 88 70 1 
Guinea Bissau 57 66 n.a. 
Ivory Coast 94 99 3 
Liberia 94 90 1 
Mauritius 77 91 n.a. 
Nigeria 66 99 2 
Reunion 82 99 n.a. 
S. Tome 83 68 n.a. 
Senegal 60 81 5 
Seychelles 83 88 n.a. 
Sierra Leone 69 65 2 
Togo 64 72 1 
Zaire 91 84 3 
Note: All figures are 1980–82 averages. 
Sources: Calculations based on FAO Production Yearbooks, FAO Trade Yearbooks, FAO 
(1984) and World Bank (1983). 
Again, the speculative character of such calculations must be stressed and before any 
conclusions can be reached, national price statistics for dairy products must be available. 
Kenya and Mali are two countries for which some information is available. Each country 
contains two markedly different ecological zones and thus features different milk production 
patterns and supply potentials, i.e. pastoral semi-subsistence and intensive mixed crop–
livestock farming. The following descriptions include the findings of country studies within the 
International Scheme for the Coordination of Dairy Development (ISCDD) (FAO, 1978c; 1981; 
1983). 
Kenya 
Kenya is generally believed to have the potential for meeting domestic milk demand, and 
throughout the 1970s the trade balance in dairy products showed a modest export surplus. The 
government encourages development of regional cooperative dairies to improve market outlets; 
maintains growth of smallholder milk production; aims to improve nutritional levels and to 
provide 'a stimulus to dairy development' with a school milk programme; and promotes a 
change to zero grazing systems in the high-potential areas where more than three quarters of 
all dairy cattle are located (FAO, 1981). 
The trade-off between producer and consumer welfare is alleviated by the government's 
commitment to a school milk programme. The major policy instruments used consist of: setting 
basic prices at the producer and retail levels; providing artificial insemination, animal health and 
other extension services; and running the school milk programme. The Kenyan Ministry of 
Livestock Development (1980) also records the existence of a 50% import duty and a 15% sales 
tax on dairy products which it wants to be removed at times of strong import demand. Beyond 
that, no articulate dairy import policy emerges. 
However, a rapidly increasing demand and the school milk programme led to a milk deficit in 
1979/80; this is likely to persist throughout the 1980s. The policy effect of creating extra demand 
for milk is obvious in this case and has been realized by the government (Kenyan Ministry of 
Livestock Development, 1980). Since 1983, the FAO/ World Food Programme (WFP) has 
provided milk powder and butter oil shipments to support the school milk programme 
(FAO/WFP, 1983). 
One could conclude that the more general measures on the production side, e.g. input 
provision, could not match the effects of government policy on the demand side. The role of 
price setting and the adequacy of the marketing system would need further analysis in this 
respect. The government's reactions, in terms of calling in the WFP and of considering a tax 
reduction for dairy imports, are well-targeted steps in an import policy, but their effects cannot 
yet be observed. The Kenyan example shows how easily a fairly balanced market can be 
disturbed by government interference. It also shows that different periods are needed for policy 
instruments to become effective: stimulating milk production is unlikely to show quick results, 
whereas dairy imports and the consumer tend to react immediately to incentives. 
Mali 
Mali is a country with a low overall potential for intensive milk production. However, the 
economic importance of livestock is substantial (Wilson et al, 1983; FAO, 1978c). To date, milk 
policy has had effects only in the Bamako region, where the country's single milk processing 
plant, Union laitière de Bamako (ULB), is located. This reflects both the government's objective 
to provide the capital with a reasonable supply of milk and the fact that the majority of milk 
production in rural areas is consumed at source (FAO, 1978c). Consequently, on the fresh milk 
market only ULB buying and selling prices are subject to price fixing and government control. 
However, effects on the domestic supply side are negligible since the plant's output is almost 
exclusively recombined milk. On the demand side, it is interesting to note that the prices for 
direct sales of fresh milk in Bamako are about 50% above the official ULB retail price for 
combined milk. This apparently reflects consumer preferences since no 'black market' for ULB 
milk exists. 
Commercial imports are subject to licensing and foreign exchange allocation, and the parastatal 
SOMIEX has a monopoly on imports of milk powder and condensed milk in cans. An average of 
26 000 t of dairy products (in LME) was imported annually from 1980 to 1982, including about 
one third as food aid. According to FAO (1983), more than half these total imports are 
consumed in Bamako. The capital's estimated milk consumption in 1984 was 20 to 25 kg LME 
per caput. In some parts of the country, especially in the northern pastoral areas, per caput milk 
consumption is substantially higher. 
The main problem is the effect of imports on consumption and production resulting from ULB 
and SOMIEX policy and price setting. The interactions between ULB and the free market, as 
well as ULB's role as a market outlet for local milk producers, are crucial for dairy development 
in the Bamako region (see also von Massow, 1984). 
Government policies can be influenced by both the agroclimatic potential and the production 
system. Government interference seems to be stronger in the 'high-potential' countries, whereas 
in the case of Mali, policies and their application are uncertain. At least in Kenya and Mali, dairy 
imports are such that special import policies are considered necessary or are already being 
pursued. 
The contribution of policy research 
The above discussion on dairy imports into sub-Saharan Africa and their policy implications has 
raised a number of issues: the impact of urbanisation on dairy and food imports; differences in 
demand for fresh vs recombined milk including their respective demand elasticities; the extent to 
which food aid substitutes or complements commercial dairy imports; and the question of how 
feasible dairy development along the lines of the 'Operation Flood' in India could be for sub-
Saharan African countries. 
All these issues should be of considerable interest to policy-makers. However, to foresee the 
impacts of any dairy import policy, there are two basic requirements: sound information must be 
available and a synchronisation of the researcher's contribution and the policy-maker's 
expectations is needed. These two conditions are obviously linked to each other. 
The information problem 
The set of statistical data that is most needed is that of domestic dairy prices. The close 
monitoring of a selected sample of markets gives an indication of the success or failure of any 
policy and enables researchers to advise on any necessary changes. The central role of prices 
in directing milk production, consumption and imports makes the improvement of price statistics 
a top priority. Dairy production data are also of great importance but are very unreliable at 
present. To improve production data is technically and organisationally more difficult than 
monitoring prices. It would help to monitor the national herds more closely and complement this 
by systematic analyses of the changes in animal productivity in some of the major production 
areas. As with prices, the survey emphasis is on continuity rather than absolute completeness 
of data. A concerted effort in these two areas would yield a high dividend and provide a 
significant step forward in policy research and formulation. 
The congruence problem 
Most economists are committed to the ideas and assumptions of the neo-classical theory. 
However, their perception of a 'welfare-enhancing' policy may be regarded as useless by policy-
makers: the economist uses an overall 'social welfare' criterion while the politician may pursue 
very different targets. The question is how to merge these sometimes conflicting attitudes. Does 
the economist have to bend to the policymaker's wishes? Or should the policy-maker defer to 
the economist? 
A first step would be to define more clearly the objectives the politician pursues and to see that 
policy research provides the decision-maker with the relative welfare costs of present or 
planned policies. To give an example, a government should be informed that while raising 
revenues of, say, US$ 50 million, an import tariff on dairy products poses a burden of US$ 200 
million on consumers' welfare while benefiting producers by only US$ 75 million, i.e. it leads to 
an overall welfare loss. The policy researchers would then have to consider the alternatives and 
describe their costs and benefits. 
The above assumes that the relationship between policy and research may well remain 
unequal. Research has to serve policy by providing information about specific policies and their 
alternatives rather than by presenting one 'optimal' solution. Thus, the inherent claim of the 
researcher to know better than the politician what might be good for the country or not, is 
excluded. 
This paper, in conclusion, argues that some dairy import policies in sub-Saharan African 
countries may have to be changed. Policy researchers will have to provide the basic information 
for policy-makers to make decisions according to their objectives. Both sides should take this as 
a challenge for cooperation. 
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List of abbreviations 
AP animal protein 
a.s.l. above sea level 
EC European Communities 
cal calorie 
CEC Commission of the European Communities (Brussels) 
c.i.f. Import price that includes the cost of insurance and freight 
DM dry matter 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Geneva 
GE gross energy 
GNP gross national product 
IDA International Development Association 
IMF International Monetary Fund (Washington D.C.) 
LME liquid milk equivalent 
LW Liveweight 
mb millibar 
MJ megajoule 
sec second 
SOMIEX  Société malienne d'importations et d'exportations  
t  metric tonne 
ULB Union laitière de Bamako 
WFP World Food Programme (Rome) 
yr year 
 
 
